Credit investors are exposed to correlated changes in issuers' conditional default rates that are due to movements in common risk factors, and the feedback jumps in default rates that are caused by the impact of a default event on the surviving firms. This article explores the risk premia investors require for bearing that exposure during April 2004-October 2007. We develop and estimate from an extensive data set of corporate defaults and market rates of CDX High Yield and Investment Grade index and tranche swaps a reduced-form model of correlated firm default under actual and risk-neutral probabilities. Our likelihood estimators indicate that CDX investors require substantial premia for the diffusive mark-to-market risk that is caused by firms' common factor exposure, and the jump-to-default risk in swap values that comes from the impact of an event on the portfolio constituents. Risk premia vary dramatically across time, portfolio composition, and holding period.
Introduction
Corporate defaults cluster. This article develops a reduced-form model of the term structure of correlated default risk under actual and risk-neutral probabilities, and estimates the time-series, cross-sectional and term-structure behavior of the premia for clustered corporate default risk during April 2004-October 2007. The analysis is based on a database of nearly 1400 default incidences, and market rates of index and tranche swaps referenced on the CDX High Yield and Investment Grade portfolios of North American issuers. The swap rates cover the entire trading history through October 2007 of High Yield and Investment Grade contracts of all maturities. They offer a unique opportunity for extracting investors' risk-neutral probabilities of joint default.
According to our pricing model, defaults are correlated because firms are exposed to a square-root diffusion risk factor, and because a default has an impact on the surviving firms that is channeled through the complex web of legal, business and informational relationships in the economy. This specification accommodates the feedback phenomena that are often observed in credit markets.
1 Our maximum likelihood estimators indicate that feedback effects induce jump risks that are of significant concern to credit investors, and that are priced into the CDX index and tranche swap market. A default is estimated to have a substantial, highly persistent impact on swap rates. Because of this influence, correlated default risk is not conditionally diversifiable as in the doubly-stochastic economy of Jarrow, Lando & Yu (2005) . A default event may command a premium even in well-diversified portfolios of credit-sensitive positions.
We find that CDX index and tranche investors require substantial compensation for bearing exposure to correlated jump-to-default risk and non-default mark-to-market risk. Non-default mark-to-market risk relates to the diffusive variation in swap market rates. It is due to firms' exposure to a common risk factor, whose diffusive movements induce correlated changes in firms' conditional default probabilities. Jump-to-default risk relates to the abrupt changes in index and tranche market rates at defaults. The jumps in market rates reflect the feedback from events and the associated adjustment of the markto-market values of the surviving portfolio constituent swaps. Our estimators indicate that this adjustment risk is economically important, and that it is priced into the CDX market. The total compensation for time-variation (diffusive and jump) in swap market rates is higher for the High Yield portfolio of low-quality issuers.
Jump-to-default risk premia vary dramatically over time, and are much higher and much more volatile for the Investment Grade portfolio of high-quality firms. During the second quarter of 2005, jump-to-default premia increased quickly to peak in May 2005, marking the height of the correlation crisis that is often linked to the downgrades of Ford and General Motors. They spiked again in September 2006, and then steadily declined, reaching almost zero in late February 2007. From this trough, jump-to-default premia surged rapidly to peak in early August 2007 at historically extreme levels, reflecting the growing concern about a serious credit crisis in the U.S. due to strings of mortgage defaults, and the spread of that crisis to the corporate credit market. Corporate credit investors sought cover in the CDX market at any price, while corporate default rates remained historically low. Jump-to-default premia declined somewhat from their extreme levels but remained relatively high through October 2007.
Our model of clustered event timing is formulated in terms of a portfolio default intensity, which represents the conditional default rate in a portfolio of correlated issuers. This top-down perspective allows us to parsimoniously describe the salient empirical characteristics of default clustering, including common factor exposure and feedback. It also allows us to capture the negative correlation between default and recovery rates that is well-documented empirically. Further, the top-down approach leads to (semi-) analytic valuation relations for index and tranche swaps, as well as computationally tractable maximum likelihood estimation of the model parameters. Our methodology enables us to empirically disentangle the effects of correlated default risk on index and tranche swap rates, and to measure the premia associated with these effects.
The presence of jump-to-default premia implies that the portfolio intensity follows distinct stochastic processes under actual and risk-neutral measures. The behavior of the actual portfolio intensity is estimated from corporate default experience in the universe of Moodys rated issuers. The dynamics of the risk-neutral intensity under actual and riskneutral probabilities are estimated from time series of CDX index and tranche swap market rates for several maturities. While the distribution of the risk-neutral intensity under the risk-neutral measure is relevant for pricing, the distribution under actual probabilities indicates the premia for diffusive and jump mark-to-market volatility that is implicit in the prices of CDX contracts.
In related work, Eckner (2007b) develops and estimates from market rates of CDX Investment Grade index, tranche and constituent credit swaps a multi-name, doublystochastic model of actual and risk-neutral intensities of individual firms. In a structural model that is fitted to single-name credit swap rates, Tarashev & Zhu (2007) compare actual asset return correlations with asset return correlations implied by CDX Investment Grade tranche rates. In a structural model of identical firms, Coval, Jurek & Stafford (2007) extract from Investment Grade CDX index rates and S&P 500 index options the risk-neutral and actual default intensities of a representative firm.
Using corporate bond price data, Driessen (2005) estimates the relationship between actual and risk-neutral single-name default intensities. Berndt, Douglas, Duffie, Ferguson & Schranz (2005) infer this relationship from single-name credit swap market rates and estimated Moody's KMV Expected Default Frequencies. These papers develop singlename default intensity models that do not incorporate the effects of default correlation among issuers.
2 Bhansali, Gingrich & Longstaff (2008 ), Feldhütter (2007 and Longstaff & Rajan (2008) fit risk-neutral intensity models to time series of CDX Investment Grade index and tranche rates. Arnsdorf & Halperin (2007) , Brigo, Pallavicini & Torresetti (2006) , Cont & Minca (2008) , Ding, Giesecke & Tomecek (2006) , Eckner (2007a) , Giesecke & Kim (2007) , Lopatin & Misirpashaev (2007) and others calibrate risk-neutral intensity models to term structures of CDX index and tranche swap market rates, all observed on a single date. These papers do not estimate risk premia.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. We begin in Section 2 by formulating and estimating a model of portfolio default intensities under actual probabilities. In Section 3, we identify the equivalent change of measure from actual to risk-neutral probabilities by specifying and estimating models for the risk-neutral portfolio intensities under actual and risk-neutral measures. The components of the measure change reflect the premia for correlated default risk. They are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix details the probabilistic setting.
Actual intensity from default events
This section specifies and estimates from the default history of Moodys rated issuers a model of economy-wide default intensities. Random thinning leads to estimates for the default intensities of the CDX portfolios of rated firms.
Corporate default data
Data on default timing are from Moodys Default Risk Service, which provides detailed issue and issuer information on industry, rating, date and type of default, and other items. Our sample period is January 1970 to October 2007, the entire period for which Moodys provides event data to subscribers. An issuer is included in our data set if it is not a sovereign and has a senior rating, which is an issuer-level rating generated by Moodys from ratings of particular debt obligations using the Senior Rating Algorithm described in Hamilton (2005) . As of October 2007, the data set includes a total of 5057 firms, of which 3263 are investment grade rated issuers.
For our purposes, a "default" is a credit event in any of the following Moodys default categories: (1) A missed or delayed disbursement of interest or principal, including delayed payments made within a grace period; (2) Bankruptcy (Section 77, Chapter 10, Chapter 11, Chapter 7, Prepackaged Chapter 11), administration, legal receivership, or other legal blocks to the timely payment of interest or principal; (3) A distressed exchange occurs where: (i) the issuer offers debt holders a new security or package of securities that amount to a diminished financial obligation; or (ii) the exchange had the apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid default.
We observe a total of 1398 defaults on 930 distinct dates. The distribution of these defaults over the dates is shown in Figure 1 . The data do not permit us to distinguish the exact default timing during the day. Roughly 51% of the defaults are due to missed interest payments and 25% are due to Chapter 11. Of the defaulted firms, 84% are of Moodys "Industrial" category and 85% are domiciled in the United States. Defaulters are rated in the categories IG, Ba, B, Caa, Ca, C and WR, where the WR category designates defaulters that were not rated at the event.
A repeated default by the same issuer is included in the set of events if it was not within a year of the initial event and the issuer's rating was raised above Caa after the initial default. This treatment of repeated defaults is consistent with that of Moodys. There are a total of 46 repeated defaults in our database.
Economy-wide intensity
The strictly increasing sequence (T n ) of the 930 default dates in our database generate a non-explosive counting process H with increments of size 1 and intensity h, relative to a complete probability space (Ω, F, P ) and an observation filtration F = (F t ) t≥0 satisfying the usual conditions. Mathematically, this means that the process defined by H t − t 0 h s ds is a local martingale with respect to the filtration F and the measure P , the actual (datagenerating) measure. Intuitively, conditional on the information set F t at time t, the likelihood of events between times t and t + ∆ is approximately h t ∆ for small ∆.
Motivated by the statistical arguments and the results of the model specification analysis in Azizpour & Giesecke (2008) , we suppose that the economy-wide intensity h evolves through time according to the model
where κ ≥ 0, c = h 0 > 0 and δ ≥ 0 are parameters and J is a jump process given by
where w ≥ 0 is a parameter and D n is the number of defaults on the event date T n . The variable D n ∈ F Tn is drawn from a fixed distribution, independently of the event dates (T m ) m≤n and the previous (D m ) m<n . At an event date, the response process J jumps and so does the intensity. Therefore, an event temporarily increases the likelihood of further arrivals. The parameters δ and w govern the response of the intensity to the number of events at an event date. The more numerous the events the stronger the feedback. After an event the intensity reverts to the level c exponentially at rate κ.
The intensity model (1)-(2) offers two potential channels for the substantial default clustering found in the arrival data (Figure 1 ). Through the response term δJ, a default has an impact on the default rates of the surviving firms. The feedback from events to arrival rates can be interpreted in terms of contagion, which is propagated through the complex web of contractual relationships in the economy. Jorion & Zhang (2007b) and others provide evidence that in such a network, the default of a firm tends to weaken the others. For example, Delphi's collapse in 2005 jeopardized General Motor's production flow, and increased the likelihood of GM's failure. The feedback from events to arrival rates can also be interpreted in terms of informational asymmetries. As in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2003) , Delloye, Fermanian & Sbai (2006) , Duffie, Eckner, Horel & Saita (2006) , Giesecke (2004) and others, firms may have a common source of frailty, a stochastic default risk factor that is unobservable relative to the filtration F, and whose posterior distribution is updated with information arrival. For example, the collapse of Enron may have revealed dubious accounting practices that may have been in use at other firms, and thus may have had an influence on the conditional default rates of these firms. For this frailty interpretation of our model, we view the observation filtration F as a sub-filtration of a complete information filtration that is not explicitly specified. Further, the process h is viewed as the (optional) projection of the complete information intensity onto F.
Our intensity model can be extended to include additional sources of diffusive or jump uncertainty that modulate the intensity between events. However, the specification analysis in Azizpour & Giesecke (2008) indicates that the inclusion of a square-root Brownian term does not improve the fit to the default data, even if additional explanatory default covariates are used in the estimation. Also, other polynomial weight specifications in the jump response process (2) were found to perform worse than the quadratic model we propose to use. Therefore, we adopt the relatively parsimonious model (1)-(2). Below we use goodness-of-fit tests to show that this simple model provides enough flexibility to accurately capture the default clustering in the data.
Likelihood estimators
The data consist of pairs (T n , D n ) n=1,...,Hτ of event dates and counts observed through time τ , October 2007. The parameter vector to be estimated is of the form Θ = (κ, c, δ, w). The law of the vector D = (D 1 , . . . , D Hτ ) is described by the empirical distribution of the sequence (D n ). By a measure change argument, the conditional joint "density"
To estimate the parameter vector Θ, we consider the maximum likelihood problem
The properties of the corresponding maximum likelihood estimator are developed in Ogata (1978) . The estimator is shown to be consistent, asymptotically normal, and efficient. We solve the likelihood problem numerically by performing a grid search over the discretized parameter space. Rather than optimizing over the full parameter space, we fix a set of candidate values {0, 0.05, 0.1, . . . , 1} for w and optimize over the remaining parameters (κ, c, δ) for each of these candidate values. Then the model is selected according to the quality of the fit to the default data rather than the log-likelihood score.
3
The goodness-of-fit of an intensity specification is evaluated with the time-scaling tests developed by Das, Duffie, Kapadia & Saita (2007) for doubly-stochastic intensity models. Azizpour & Giesecke (2008) show how these tests can be extended to arbitrary intensity models, including the model (1) studied here. The extension is based on a result of Meyer (1971) , which implies that the counting process H can be transformed into a standard Poisson process by a stochastic change of time that is given by the cumulative intensity. If h is correctly specified, then the time-scaled event dates form a realization of a standard Poisson process in the time-scaled filtration, which we test using a KolmogorovSmirnov (KS) test and Prahl's (1999) test. The KS test addresses the deviation of the empirical distribution function of the time-scaled inter-arrival times from their theoretical standard exponential distribution function. Prahl's test is particularly sensitive to large deviations of the time-scaled times from their theoretical mean 1. Our estimator of Θ is given byΘ = (1.81, 5.77, 0.40, 0.50). The fitted values for δ and w indicate the significant influence of defaults on arrival rates, and suggest the presence of substantial feedback from events through contagion or frailty. Figure 2 contrasts the empirical distribution of the time-scaled inter-arrival times generated by the fitted intensity h with the theoretical standard exponential distribution. The KS test indicates that the deviation of the empirical distribution of the time-scaled inter-arrival times from the exponential distribution is not significant at the 5% level. Prahl's test statistic is within 0.1 standard deviations from its theoretical mean, also indicating that the deviation of the time-scaled times from their theoretical distribution is not significant.
The results of the goodness-of-fit tests indicate that the estimated model (1) of the economy-wide intensity h replicates the substantial time-series variation of default rates in the universe of Moodys rated firms during 1970-2007. Next we thin h to obtain estimates of default intensities for portfolios of rated firms.
Portfolio intensity
Consider a finite portfolio of Moodys rated firms and let N be the counting process of defaults in the portfolio. Suppose N has increments of size 1 and intensity λ, meaning that the process N t − t 0 λ s ds is a martingale relative to P . The intensity λ t represents the conditional portfolio default rate at t given the information set F t . It is equal to the sum of the single firm intensities λ k t over the portfolio constituents k that have survived to t.
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To estimate the λ k from the fitted economy-wide intensity h, consider the process H ρ that records the number of events in rating category ρ, given by
n is the number of ρ-rated firms that default at the event date T n . The total number of events at T n is D n = ρ D ρ n . Assuming that the D ρ n are independent across ρ and n, the process H ρ has intensity h ρ = hE[D ρ n ], which represents the total default intensity of all ρ-rated firms in our database.
5 The D ρ n are modeled by their empirical distribution.
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Now let X ρ t be the index set of ρ-rated firms in our database that have survived to time t. Assuming that each ρ-rated firm is equally likely to default at an event date, we propose to estimate the intensity λ k t of an ρ-rated firm k ∈ X ρ t by the ratio h ρ t /|X ρ t |. Then, with Y ρ t denoting the index set of ρ-rated firms in the portfolio that have survived to time t, the actual portfolio default intensity λ t is estimated by
We consider the CDX High Yield (HY) and Investment Grade (IG) index portfolios. As of October 2007, the on-the-run HY index consists of 2 Baa, 48 Ba, 36 B and 14 Caa rated firms, giving a total of 100 constituents. The on-the-run IG index consists of 3 Aaa, 3 Aa, 51 A, 64 Baa and 4 Ba rated firms (125 constituents). We account for revisions of the portfolio compositions ("index rolls"), which take place every 6 months. There is a clear downward trend in the conditional default rates for both portfolios. This trend echoes the decline of overall default rates of Moodys rated firms during that period, as indicated in Figure 1 . In October 2007, these default rates were at historically low levels. The spike in the intensity that is visible for the IG portfolio and pronounced for the HY portfolio is triggered by defaults of three Caa-rated industrial firms during August and the defaults of Delta Air Lines (C-rated) and Northwest Airlines (Caa-rated) on September 14, 2005.
For the risk premium analysis in Section 4 below, we require the fitted portfolio intensity λ only for the period [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Nevertheless, to estimate λ we use the entire Moodys default history, which covers the period 1970-2007. Since defaults are typically low-probability events, we need to include as many observations as possible in the estima-
ds is a P -martingale, where N k is the indicator process associated with the default of firm k. See Giesecke & Goldberg (2005) for more details.
5 More precisely, the process defined by
h ρ s ds is a martingale relative to P . 6 Instead of inferring h ρ from h, we could have specified separate intensity models h ρ for the total of all firms in a given rating category ρ. A model h ρ could have been estimated from the observed event times of ρ-rated firms, which form a subset of the sequence (T n ).
7 This estimate ignores the probability of observing more than just one event in the portfolio on the same day. Based on our event data, we find that this probability is negligible.
8 For the roll dates and the list of constituents that are exchanged at each roll see the website www.markit.com of Markit, the calculation agent for the CDX. 
Risk-neutral intensity from CDX market rates
Having estimated the intensity λ of the portfolio default process N under the actual probability measure P , in this section we use market prices of CDX portfolio derivatives to estimate the intensity of N under a risk-neutral pricing measure. The risk-neutral intensity reflects the market valuation of correlated corporate default risk. We are interested in how this market valuation differs from the actual default expectations embedded in λ.
We assume that there are no arbitrage opportunities or market frictions. Then, under mild technical conditions, there exists a risk-neutral probability measure that is equivalent to the actual probability measure P . We fix a risk-neutral measure P * with respect to a constant risk-free interest rate r > 0. The change of measure will be made precise as we proceed. Technical details are in Appendix A.
Index and tranche swap pricing
We adopt the valuation approach of Errais, Giesecke & Goldberg (2006) , according to which a portfolio derivative is viewed as a contingent claim on the portfolio default process N or the portfolio loss process L = N n≥0 n , where n is the random loss at the nth default. An index swap referenced on a CDX portfolio is one of the most liquid portfolio derivatives. It is based on a portfolio whose C constituent single-name credit swaps have common notional that we normalize to 1, common maturity date T and common quarterly premium payment dates (t m ). The protection seller agrees to cover portfolio losses as they occur. The value D t at time t ≤ T of these payments is given by the discounted cumulative losses. By integration by parts, we get the formula
where E * t denotes conditional expectation under the risk-neutral measure P * with respect to the information set F t . The protection buyer agrees to make a stream of premium payments at dates (t m ). The cash flow at t m is a fraction I of the total notional on the names that have survived until t m . Neglecting premium accruals, the value at time t ≤ T of the premium payments is given by
where c m is the appropriate day count fraction for the period m. The fair index swap spread at time t is the solution I = I t to the equation D t = P t (I). The spread depends only on expected defaults and losses for horizons in (t, T ]. Investors seeking narrower risk profiles can trade tranches referenced on the CDX. A tranche swap is specified by a lower attachment point K ∈ [0, 1] and an upper attachment point K ∈ (K, 1]. The product of the difference K = K − K and the portfolio notional C is the tranche notional. The tranche protection seller agrees to cover portfolio losses as they occur, given that the cumulative losses are larger than KC but do not exceed KC. The cumulative payments at time t, denoted U t , are
The value of these payments at time t is
This formula is analogous to formula (6) for the value of an index swap default leg. The latter can be viewed as the default leg of a tranche swap for which K = 0 and K = 1. The premium payments of the tranche protection buyer consist of two parts. The first part is an upfront payment, which is expressed as a fraction R of the tranche notional KC. The second part is a stream of payments at dates (t m ). For a tranche with K < 1, the cash flow at t m is a fraction S of the difference between the tranche notional and the tranche loss at t m . Neglecting accruals, the value of the premium leg is given by
For a fixed upfront payment rate R, the fair tranche spread S is the solution S = S t (K, K, R) to the equation
Similarly, for a fixed tranche spread S, the fair tranche upfront rate R is the solution R = R t (K, K, S) to the equation
The fair spread and upfront rate depend only on the value of call spreads on the portfolio loss L s with strikes K and K and maturities s ∈ (t, T ].
Risk-neutral portfolio intensity
To value CDX index and tranche swaps, we model the default and loss processes under the risk-neutral measure P * . The default counting process N is specified in terms of a risk-neutral intensity λ * that represents the conditional portfolio default rate with respect to P * . More precisely, we suppose that there is a process λ * such that the compensated default counting process, given by N t − t 0 λ * s ds, is a martingale relative to P * . The riskneutral intensity λ * is the counterpart to the actual intensity λ of N estimated in Section 2 above. As indicated in Appendix A, modeling λ * for a given specification of λ amounts to identifying the Radon-Nikodym derivative that defines the change of measure from P to P * , i.e., the pricing kernel of the economy.
The maximum likelihood approach to estimating λ * that we propose requires us to specify the distribution of λ * under both P and P * . We suppose that under actual probabilities, λ * evolves through time according to the model
whereκ * ,c * , σ * , and δ * are parameters with 2κ * c * ≥ (σ * ) 2 that satisfy the technical conditions stated in Appendix A, W is a standard Brownian motion relative to P , and where L = N n≥0 n is the portfolio loss process. The random loss n is drawn from a P -distribution ν, independently of the information set F τn− , where τ n is the nth default time in the portfolio.
9 The intensity jumps at arrivals, together with the default and loss processes. Note that under P , the arrivals are governed by the actual intensity λ. The jump size is proportional to the realized loss at an event.
Next we specify the distribution of λ * under the risk-neutral measure P * , which is relevant for the valuation of index and tranche swaps. Motivated by the successful CDX index and tranche market calibrations reported in Giesecke & Kim (2007) , we suppose that under risk-neutral probabilities, λ * follows the model
where κ * =κ * + ησ * , κ * c * =κ * c * for a parameter η such that W * t = W t + η t 0 λ * s ds is a standard Brownian motion with respect to P * ; see Appendix A. The parameter η represents the risk premium for the diffusive volatility of risk-neutral arrival rates. The intensity jumps at arrivals along with N and L. The arrivals are governed by λ * itself. The jump size is proportional to the realized loss at an event, n , which we suppose is drawn P * -independently of F τn− from the distribution ν, which also governs n under P .
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The dynamics of the risk-neutral intensity λ * have similar features under the two measures. Thanks to the feedback term δ * L, the intensity always responds to defaults.
9 The parameter δ * can be subsumed into the distribution ν. We introduce it here to facilitate a comparison of the sensitivity of λ * across different portfolios that share the same ν. 10 In other words, we assume that there is no premium for recovery risk. This assumption is motivated by the fact that we observe no events for the IG portfolio and only 4 events in the HY portfolio during the sample period, making it difficult to accurately estimate such a premium.
However, the frequency of defaults differs under the two measures, and so does the frequency of the jumps in λ * : they arrive at rate λ under P and rate λ * under P * . The size of the response jumps is inversely proportional to the realized recovery at an event. The lower the recovery, the larger the increase of the intensity at the event. This specification replicates the negative correlation between recovery and default rates found by Altman, Brady, Resti & Sironi (2005) and others. After an event, the intensity reverts back to a constant level, which is given byc * under P , and c * under P * . The decay is exponential in mean, with rateκ * under P and rate κ * under P * . These four parameters are related through the constraintκ * c * = κ * c * , which is imposed by our "completely affine" specification of the market price of risk for W .
11 The diffusive fluctuations of λ * between events are governed by the square-root Brownian term, whose volatility is σ * . Our model specification allows us to derive computationally tractable expressions for index and tranche swap rates. Since the processes N and L are affine point processes in the sense of Errais et al. (2006) , the characteristic function of (N, L) is an exponentially affine function of the state. We have the formula
where t ≤ T , i is the imaginary unit, v is a real number and the coefficient functions α(t) = α(v, t, T ) and β(t) = β(v, t, T ) solve the ordinary differential equations
with boundary conditions β(T ) = α(T ) = 0 and jump transform
where ν is the distribution of the loss at default n , and u is any complex number such that q(u, v) is well defined for a given real v. The characteristic function of N is given by the right hand side of equation (12), with coefficient functions α(t) and β(t) satisfying equations (13)- (14), where
are obtained by differentiating the corresponding characteristic functions. We obtain closed form expressions for these expectations. From equations (6) and (7), we then get a closed form expression for the model index swap spread I t . Model tranche rates do not take a closed form. We first obtain the conditional loss distribution by Fourier inversion of the characteristic function (12). The price of an option on L is gotten by integrating the option payoff against the loss distribution. The option price determines the tranche rate through formulae (8)-(9).
12
11 We do not opt for the more comprehensive "extended affine" risk premium specification proposed by Cheridito, Filipovic & Kimmel (2007) , largely because our sample period is relatively short.
12 Alternatively, tranche rates can be estimated by Monte Carlo simulation of L. Giesecke & Kim (2007) provide an exact simulation algorithm for the model (11).
We contrast our index and tranche pricing model with the three-factor pricing model of Longstaff & Rajan (2008) , according to which defaults are triggered by independent idiosyncratic, sector-wide and economy-wide shocks that are governed by Feller diffusion intensities under the risk-neutral measure. Sector-and economy-wide shocks cause large numbers of firms to default simultaneously, and thus generate default clusters. In our pricing model, defaults occur at distinct times. They are clustered because firms are exposed to a common Feller diffusion risk factor, and because an event has an impact on the surviving firms whose strength depends on the realized loss at the event. Thus, there are two sources of uncertainty that influence the evolution of risk-neutral default intensities: a systematic Brownian motion factor and the recovery at events. The introduction of recovery as a risk factor allows us to describe the negative correlation between default and recovery rates that is empirically well-documented.
It is straightforward to extend our risk-neutral intensity model to include additional diffusion and jump terms, as well as time-dependent coefficient functions. As demonstrated in Errais et al. (2006) , generalizations along these lines do not diminish the computational tractability of index and tranche swap pricing: the loss process transform is still of the form (12). However, such generalizations would render the maximum likelihood problem computationally challenging. Perhaps more importantly, it is arguable whether a more comprehensive intensity model can be accurately estimated given our relatively limited sample size. Our estimation results, described in Section 3.4 below, indicate that the model (11) offers a good compromise between parsimony and fitting flexibility.
Likelihood estimators
We fix a set {0, 1, . . . , τ } of observation dates. At a date t, our observations consist of a vector (I t , S t , N t , L t ), where I t is the mid-market index spread and S t = (S 1t , . . . , S nt ) is a vector of mid-market rates of n tranches. All rates are with respect to a common maturity. The Markov property of the process (λ * , N, L) under P * along with the index swap pricing formulae developed in Section 3.1 imply that there is a function G : R + × N → R + that is increasing and continuously differentiable in its first argument such that
where θ = (κ * , c * , σ * , δ * , η, µ) is a vector of parameters to be estimated, with µ denoting the parameter vector of the distribution ν of the loss at default. The model index spread at t does not depend on L t , but only on the risk-neutral expected loss at an event. At a given (θ, N t , I t ), the model-implied risk-neutral intensity at t is thus given by
where H : R + × N → R + . While the spread on the liquid index is measured without error, we suppose the rates on the less liquid tranches are corrupted with Gaussian noise. 13 For functions F k : R + × R + → R + implied by the pricing formulae developed in Section 3.1,
where kt is a normally distributed random variable with mean zero and variance v 2 k , with respect to the actual probability measure P . The error variables kt are independent of one another, and independent across tranches and observation dates, under P . We let v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) denote the standard deviation of the errors. Note that the model tranche rate S kt does not depend on the default count N t .
The index spread is the transformed value of the latent risk-neutral intensity, with the index pricing function (15) defining the transformation. By standard change of variable arguments we obtain the log-likelihood function of the data as
is the conditional density of λ * 0 , both under P . Note from equation (10) that λ * follows a P -Feller diffusion between events. The jumps in λ * arrive with P -intensity λ. Therefore,
is the non-central chi-squared density, which is easily calculated. 14 The function ∂ 1 H(·, ·; θ) is the partial derivative of H(·, ·; θ) with respect to its first argument. It enters into the third term of the log-likelihood function, which reflects the fact that the risk-neutral intensity is extracted from the index spread observation. The fourth term L N,L represents the log-likelihood function of the vector (N 0 , L 0 , . . . , N τ , L τ ). This likelihood is determined by the P -intensity model λ, which was already estimated in Section 2 above, and the P -distribution ν of the loss at events, which is specified by the parameter vector µ. Finally, the last term of the loglikelihood function accounts for the noisy tranche rate observations, where φ(·; V ) is the density of a Gaussian random variable with mean zero and variance V .
The likelihood problem has features that are unique to the multi-name setting. While a credit swap referenced on an individual issuer expires at default, index and tranche swap rates are quoted until maturity, even after the reference portfolio suffers defaults. Model index and tranche rates depend on the number of events and the cumulative loss induced by these events. Therefore, the likelihood function L contains the density of the portfolio default and loss processes relative to the actual measure P . This density is represented by the term L N,L , which is governed by the specification of the actual portfolio intensity λ. At least in principle, we could therefore have estimated λ together with the risk-neutral intensity λ * by maximizing the likelihood function L with respect to the parameters of the models for λ and λ * . However, this strategy is not viable due to the low number of CDX defaults during the sample period 2004-2007. This motivates our two-step procedure, in which the actual CDX intensity λ is inferred from the actual economy-wide intensity h, whose estimation is based on all defaults of Moody's rated issuers during 1970-2007. The risk-neutral CDX intensity λ * is estimated from price data in a subsequent likelihood step, taking the fitted λ as given.
The maximum likelihood estimator of the parameter vector (θ, v) solves sup θ,v L(θ, v). We use a grid search algorithm to numerically find the solution to this problem.
15 Our preliminary experiments indicated that the distribution ν of the loss at default is hard to pin down with the available data. Therefore, we settled on a fixed uniform distribution over {0.34, 0.84}, which was found by Giesecke & Kim (2007) to give the best fit to CDX High Yield index and tranche market rates of all traded maturities, all observed on a given day. While allowing for random variations in recovery rates, this specification implies a mean loss at default of approximately 0.6, consistent with the industry standard assumption of 40% fixed recovery at default. We are left with the 5 intensity parameters κ * , c * , σ * , δ * and η, as well as the n measurement error volatilities v k . The term L N,L in the log-likelihood function L(θ, v) is independent of these parameters, and can therefore be ignored in the likelihood maximization.
Data and estimation results
We implement the estimation for the CDX High Yield and Investment Grade portfolios. Our data set consists of daily closing bid and ask quotes of spread and upfront rates for on-the-run index and tranche contracts of all traded maturities. It covers virtually the entire trading history of the two CDX indexes through November 29, 2007, allowing 0-10% and 10-15% HY tranches is quoted in terms of an upfront rate, while the price for protection on the 0-3% IG tranche is quoted in terms of an upfront rate plus a spread of 500 basis points that is paid quarterly. All other tranches are quoted in terms of a running spread that is paid quarterly. To reduce the noise in the data, we use weekly mid-market quotes, usually observed on Wednesdays. If a Wednesday quote is not available, we use the average of the Tuesday and Thursday quotes. This leaves us with 158 quotes for the 5 year IG contracts and 156 quotes for the 5 year HY contracts. To facilitate the estimation of the diffusive risk premium η, we ignore index rolls.
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In view of the different observation periods, we perform the estimation separately for each available contract maturity. The corresponding maximum likelihood parameter estimates are given in Table 1 . The feedback coefficients δ * are estimated to be strictly positive, indicating that a default has a substantial impact on CDX index and tranche market rates. The impact is stronger for the HY contracts, which are referenced on lowquality firms. The fitted decay rates κ * suggest that the impact is more persistent for the IG contracts. The HY portfolio is estimated to have a greater base default rate, as indicated by the fitted reversion levels c * . Also the diffusive volatility σ * of default rates is estimated to be higher for the HY portfolio. The fitted values of the market price of risk η for W are discussed in Section 4. Figure 4 shows the time series of the fitted risk-neutral default intensities for the HY and IG portfolios, based on the estimates for the 5 year contracts. Given a pair of observations (I t , N t ), the fitted risk-neutral intensity at t is obtained from formula (16) evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimatorθ. There were no defaults in the IG portfolio so N t = 0 for all observation dates t. As expected, the HY intensity is higher than the IG intensity. The intensities spiked during May 2005, with the IG intensity experiencing a relatively larger increase than the HY intensity. These spikes reflected the broad widening of spreads due to anticipated problems in the auto industry, triggered by the downgrades of Ford and GM. After a relatively quiet period, the intensities again sharply increased more recently during the spring and summer of 2007 in response to the signs of a credit crisis in the U.S. The increase in the IG intensity was proportionately bigger than that in the HY intensity.
Tranche pricing errors
Our estimation assumes that index spreads are measured without error. Therefore, they are always matched perfectly. Tranche rates are corrupted with noise so they are not fitted exactly. We compare market tranche rates with model-implied rates F k (λ * t , L t ;θ), where λ * t is the fitted risk-neutral intensity obtained from formula (16), andθ is the maximum likelihood estimator of θ. For the purpose of calculating the model-implied rates, we assume a realized recovery rate of 40% for the four HY defaults during the sample period, consistent with standard industry practice and the mean loss at default we assume in the estimation. Figure 5 shows the time series of observed and fitted 5 year HY tranche rates. Figure 6 graphs the time series for the 5 year IG tranches.
The model replicates the substantial cross-sectional and extreme time-series variation of CDX tranche rates during [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . While the tranche pricing errors vary considerably, they do not seem to follow a particular pattern. As a diagnostic check, we examine 
where S kt is the market rate of the kth tranche at t. Under the specified model, and under actual probabilities, these errors are independent across tranches k and observation dates t, and are normally distributed with mean zero and variance v 2 k . Figure 7 shows the histogram of the standardized errors across all 5 year tranches. The empirical distribution of the HY errors is in good agreement with the standard normal distribution, indicating the adequacy of our model specification for the HY portfolio. The empirical distribution of the IG errors indicates that the model fits the IG tranche rates less well. However, since the deviations from the normal distribution are largely symmetric, the model does not exhibit a significant pricing bias. IG tranches are only slightly overpriced: the sample mean is −0.038 and the sample standard deviation is 1.085. For the HY tranches, the sample mean is −0.213 and the sample standard deviation is 1.001. Bhansali et al. (2008) , who extract market expectations about systemic default risk from CDX and iTraxx index and tranche market rates. After controlling for idiosyncratic and sector-wide risk, they find that the 2007 mortgage-induced crisis had more than twice the systemic default risk of the 2005 auto crisis.
Portfolio loss distribution
The shape of the loss distributions implied by our fitted model differs significantly from the shape of the loss distributions implied by the three-factor pricing model fitted by Longstaff & Rajan (2008) . While the distributions generated by our model are unimodal, their loss distributions have three modes, which correspond to the three independent factors driving risk-neutral default arrivals. 
Discussion
It is instructive to contrast our statistical methodology with that employed by Longstaff & Rajan (2008, LR) to fit an index and tranche pricing model to a time series of 5 year CDX IG market rates. Assuming that all market rates are measured without error, LR use a non-linear least squares algorithm to fit distinct risk-neutral three-factor models for each of the 6 month roll periods during October 2003 to October 2005. For each of those periods, the algorithm matches index spreads perfectly and minimizes the root mean squared tranche pricing errors during the period.
Our maximum likelihood approach allows us to take account of measurement errors in the tranche data. Only the spreads of the much more liquid index contracts are assumed to be measured precisely, and these values are matched perfectly. The estimation procedure does not directly optimize over tranche pricing errors. Therefore, the absolute root mean squared pricing error is not the appropriate metric to assess model fit. Rather, we examine how well the empirical distribution of fitted tranche pricing errors conforms to the specified distribution of the errors.
The likelihood approach also allows us to estimate the dynamics of the risk-neutral intensity under both actual and risk-neutral measures. As a result, we obtain an estimate of the market price of risk for the Brownian motion driving the risk-neutral intensity. This premium indicates investors' aversion towards diffusive spread fluctuations. This has a price, however: the premium is notoriously hard to pin down, and the associated estimation errors may affect the quality of the fit to the tranches. Rather than breaking up the sample period into 6 month long index roll periods and estimating separate models for these sub-periods, we estimate one model (one set θ of parameters) for the entire sample period. This 3.5 year period consists of very benign times with extremely low spreads (beginning of 2007) and very turbulent ones with dramatic spread changes and very high spread levels (summer 2007). Fitting this substantial spread variation is much more challenging than fitting the relatively small changes in spreads that occurred during any of the 6 month roll periods preceding 2006. Our model does a really good job at fitting this variation, especially for the HY index.
The likelihood perspective proposed here facilitates a more holistic approach to model fitting than the calibration approach that is typically taken in the portfolio derivatives literature, for example Arnsdorf & Halperin (2007) , Brigo et al. (2006) , Cont & Minca (2008) , Ding et al. (2006) and Lopatin & Misirpashaev (2007) . Using an objective function that penalizes index and tranche pricing errors, Giesecke & Kim (2007) fit the risk-neutral intensity model (11) to market rates of contracts of all available maturities, all observed on the same day. While this approach is well suited to exploit term structure data, it typically ignores time series data. Instead, the model is re-calibrated every day.
CDX risk premia
An index or tranche investor is exposed to the diffusive volatility in swap market rates that we call non-default mark-to-market risk, and the jumps in market rates at events, called jump-to-default risk. This section analyzes the premia that investors demand for bearing exposure to these risks. These premia identify the equivalent change of probability measure from actual to risk-neutral probabilities, as detailed in Appendix A.
Non-default mark-to-market risk is induced by firms' sensitivity to a common risk factor, which in our model is represented by the Brownian motion W . The fluctuations of W generate correlated changes in firms' default probabilities. The compensation for bearing the exposure to co-movements in firms' default probabilities is measured by the parameter η, which identifies the change of measure for W . The fitted values for η, shown in Table 1 above, are strictly positive for all contracts, indicating that non-default markto-market risk is economically important, and priced into the CDX market.
The premium for non-default mark-to-market risk is realized as a change to the drift of risk-neutral intensities λ * . A positive η implies that the impact of an event on λ * is less persistent under P * . The premium for bearing correlated jump-to-default risk is realized as a change to the intensity itself: the risk-neutral intensity λ * and the actual intensity λ follow distinct processes. This change to the intensity also has implications for the feedback jumps of λ * that occur at events. Under P , the jumps arrive with intensity λ. Under P * , the jumps arrive with intensity λ * . This adjustment of arrival rates can be viewed as compensation for the abrupt changes in index and tranche mark-to-market values at events, which are due to the impact of an event on the default rates of the surviving single-name constituents. Constituent spreads are revised at events, and so are index and tranche mark-to-market values. If these feedback phenomena are ignored, then the risk-neutral intensity does not jump at events, and any compensation for jumps at events is absorbed into the premium for non-default mark-to-market risk.
The total compensation π for any time-variation (diffusive or jump at defaults) in index and tranche market rates is measured by the difference between the jump-compensated drift of λ * under P and its counterpart under P * . It is given by
The first term in formula (19) represents compensation for diffusive volatility, and the second term represents compensation for volatility due to jumps at events. The compensation for jump volatility is proportional to the expected feedback jump of the risk-neutral intensity at an event. It vanishes when event feedback is absent (δ * = 0). Figure 9 , which displays the fitted π for 5 year contracts, indicates that CDX IG investors require much less compensation for the time-variation in index and tranche rates than HY investors. The compensation for variation in IG rates was almost zero at the end of The case λ * = λ would imply that index and tranche investors are not requiring compensation for correlated jump-to-default risk. In that case, CDX risk premia would be entirely due to non-default mark-to-market risk, and the change of measure from P to P * would be completely specified by η. Jarrow et al. (2005) provide conditions under which actual and risk-neutral single-firm intensities agree. A sufficient condition is that there are infinitely many firms, all exposed to the same risk factor, and all defaulting independently conditional on the risk factor. In our model specification, the conditional independence (doubly-stochastic) assumption is violated because a default event has an impact on the surviving firms. Therefore, a default event may command a premium even if the portfolio consists of a large number of firms.
We measure the jump-to-default premium by the ratio of risk-neutral portfolio intensity λ * to actual intensity λ. This ratio specifies the change of measure for the default process N . The risk-neutral intensity represents the market price for protection against instantaneous defaults in the portfolio, given current market information and past defaults and their recoveries. The actual intensity represents the expected number of instantaneous arrivals in the portfolio, given historical default experience. The portfolio intensities incorporate the substantial effects of default correlation among portfolio constituents. Their ratio can be viewed as the proportional premium for bearing correlated default event risk. For example, if this ratio is 2 for a particular date, then an insurance contract that pays one dollar in the event of an event in the next instant would be priced at twice the actual instantaneous default probability. Figure 10 graphs the fitted ratios of λ * to λ for the HY and IG portfolios, based on estimates obtained from 5 year contracts. Figure 11 plots the ratios based on estimates obtained from 3, 7 and 10 year contracts. The wide gaps between λ * and λ indicate that credit investors demand substantial compensation for bearing exposure to correlated jump-to-default risk, with generally much higher jump-to-default premia for the IG portfolio of high-quality firms, for all maturities. Note that the relation between IG and HY contracts is reversed if we consider the total premium π for any time-variation in CDX rates: IG investors require less compensation for time-variation than HY investors.
Jump-to-default premia vary dramatically over time. After an initial downward trend, during the second quarter of 2005 premia increased quickly to peak in May 2005, marking the height of the correlation crisis that is often linked to the downgrades of Ford and General Motors. The premia spiked again in September 2006, and then steadily declined to bottom out in late February 2007. From this trough, premia surged rapidly to peak at historically extreme levels in early August 2007, reflecting the appearing signs of a credit crunch in the U.S. due to strings of mortgage defaults. The premia declined somewhat from these levels but remained relatively high through October 2007. Figure 12 graphs the rolling relative monthly changes of the jump-to-default premia. IG premia are much more volatile than HY premia. The largest relative changes occurred in late February and early March 2007, during a period of heavy losses in equity markets. IG premia climbed from a historical low of 1.65 on February 21st to 24.34 on March 7th. During that same two week period, HY premia climbed from 2.47 to 5.96. The largest absolute changes occurred later during the summer 2007. HY premia reached their historical high of 19.75 on August 1st, while IG premia stood at 140 on that date. IG premia peaked at 144.11 two weeks later. While the IG jump-to-default premia are large, the overall compensation π for any time-variation in CDX IG spreads is moderate.
The substantial changes in jump-to-default premia during July and August 2007 may be related to the unprecedented losses during the second week of August at hedge funds and proprietary trading desks employing primarily "statistical arbitrage" strategies. Khandani & Lo (2007) argue that the losses were initiated by the rapid unwinding of one or more large quantitative equity market-neutral portfolios, "perhaps in response to margin calls from a deteriorating credit portfolio" (page 2). Our estimates indicate that credit concerns may indeed have played a role in the "quant crisis." As shown in Figure 13 , risk premia increased significantly during July, with relatively larger growth in the second half of the month. HY premia roughly doubled from 10 to 20 during July, while IG premia increased from 40 to roughly 140. Jump-to-default premia peaked on August 1st, just 4 trading days before the quant crisis ensued.
The fitted time series behavior of jump-to-default premia echoes a common view held by market participants that the risk of contagion from the mortgage market was perceived highest during July and August 2007. During these months, signs of a serious mortgage crisis appeared, and investors with exposure to corporate credit risk sought cover in the CDX market at any price, driving index and tranche rates to unprecedented levels. Actual corporate defaults remained at historically low levels, however.
Our interpretation is consistent with the findings of Bhansali et al. (2008) , who extract market expectations about systemic risk from the North American CDX market and the European iTraxx market. Systemic risk represents scenarios with large numbers of defaults. After controlling for idiosyncratic and sector-wide risk, Bhansali et al. (2008) find that the level of systemic risk priced into the index and tranche market has been on the rise ever since the mortgage crisis appeared in the summer of 2007. Our fitted jump-to-default premia reflect that high level of systemic risk.
It remains to clarify the role of liquidity for the large jump-to-default premia we estimated during the summer of 2007. While during that period default protection buyers clearly preferred the CDX index market to the largely illiquid single-name market, the number and size of typical CDX trades declined and bid/ask spreads widened, especially for the more senior tranches. However, our analysis of the time series of bid/ask spreads showed that at their peak in August 2007, bid/ask spreads were not significantly wider than those measured during the auto crisis in May 2005, when jump-to-default premia stood at roughly one half of their value at the August 2007 peak. This indicates that liquidity problems are unlikely to have overly inflated the jump-to-default premia estimates for the summer of 2007.
Conclusion
This article develops a reduced-form model of correlated firm default under actual and risk-neutral probabilities. Defaults are clustered because firms are exposed to a common square-root diffusion risk factor, and because an event has an impact on the surviving firms that is channeled through the complex web of legal, business and informational relationships in the economy. This model is used to estimate the price for bearing exposure to clustered corporate default risk during [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . The analysis is based on corporate default history and market rates of index and tranche swaps referenced on the CDX High Yield and Investment Grade portfolios of North American issuers.
We find that CDX investors require substantial, strongly time-varying premia for the diffusive mark-to-market risk that is due to firms' common factor exposure, and the jump-to-default risk in swap mark-to-market values that is due to the impact of events on the portfolio constituents. Jump-to-default premia are higher for the Investment Grade portfolio of high-quality firms, while the total compensation for diffusive and jump volatility in swap values is higher for the High Yield portfolio of low-quality issuers. These findings indicate that a significant portion of corporate default risk is not diversifiable. This has implications for the risk management in financial institutions.
A Probabilistic setting
This appendix discusses the probabilistic setting in more detail. Fix a complete probability space (Ω, F, P ), with P denoting the actual probability measure, and a right-continuous and complete filtration F = (F t ) t≥0 . Let W be a standard Brownian motion and let N be a non-explosive counting process that describes the defaults in a fixed portfolio of firms. The process N has increments of size one almost surely, and we assume that its Doob-Meyer compensator is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. The corresponding density process λ is assumed to be strictly positive. This process represents the actual portfolio default intensity, and is modeled and estimated in Section 2. The portfolio loss process records the cumulative financial loss due to defaults. It is given by L = N n≥0 n , where ( n ) is a sequence of bounded random variables that are drawn from a fixed distribution ν that has no mass at zero.
Let λ * be a strictly positive process, η ∈ R and τ > 0 be a finite horizon such that
s ds is finite almost surely,
